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1 Introduction
Policies such as fuel taxes, technology programs, or even international agreements on
pollution emissions reductions are likely to entail a demand change in some important
exhaustible-resource markets. When resource sellers are strategic, they have an incentive
to distort these policies to their own advantage, potentially leading to an increased de-
pendence on the resource. To understand the seller side effort to distort the adoption of
demand-changing policies, we consider a simple framework where a monopolistic seller
(or a group of sellers coordinating actions) of an exhaustible resource faces demand from
a buyer (or a group of buyers coordinating actions) who has a substitute but there is a
time-to-build delay for the substitute. We find that in this framework the basic impli-
cations of the Hotelling model (1931) are reversed: over time the resource stock declines
but supplies increase, rather than decrease, up to the point where the buyer decides to
initiate the transition to the substitute. Under such a threat of change in the demand
infrastructure, the supply today does not reflect the true resource scarcity, but it seeks
to postpone the buyer’s decision by compensating for the future scarcity felt during the
transition time to the substitute when the buyer is still dependent on the resource.
Our research builds on Hotelling’s theory of exhaustible-resource consumption (1931),
Nordhaus’ (1973) concept of a backstop technology,1 and the extensive literature on
strategic equilibria in resource economics. Our main addition to the standard frame-
work for analysis is the inclusion of a time-to-build delay for the backstop. Previous
literature closest to our approach can be divided on the assumptions made for the strate-
gic variable on the buyer side.2 First, there is a large literature on optimal tariffs in
depletable-resource markets showing how coordinated action on the buyer side can be
1Nordhaus (1973) was the first to define and analyze the concept of backstop technology in
exhaustible-resource markets. He defined it as follows: ”The concept that is relevant to this prob-
lem is the backstop technology, a set of processes that (1) is capable of meeting the demand requirements
and (2) has a virtually infinite resource base” (Nordhaus, 1973, pp. 547-548).
2There is a large but less closely related literature focusing purely on seller power in the exhaustible-
resource framework. Hotelling himself (1931) already analyzed the monopoly case. Salant (1976) con-
sidered an oligopolistic market structure with one dominant firm, and Lewis and Schmalensee (1980)
analyzed an oligopoly where all firms have some market power. This literature has developed on two
frontiers. First, it has focused on developing less restrictive production strategies: from path strategies
as in Lewis and Schmalensee, Loury (1986) and Polansky (1992), to decision rule strategies as, for ex-
ample, in Salo and Tahvonen (2001). Second, the literature has developed more natural cost concepts
for extraction under which the resource is economically rather than physically depleted. See Salo and
Tahvonen (2001) for a discussion and contribution on this.
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used to decrease the seller’s resource rent (e.g., Newbery, 1983, Maskin and Newbery,
1990; see Karp and Newbery 1993 for a review). Ho¨rner and Kamien (2004) provide
a general view on these models by showing that the problem faced by a monopsonistic
exhaustible-resource buyer is formally equivalent to that faced by a Coasian durable-
good monopoly. We depart from the Coasian framework because the buyer is not a pure
monopsony and has a different strategic variable (the substitute). While import tariffs
and fuel taxes are important, they are more flexible instruments as compared to the
development or adoption of substitute technologies that have a permanent effect on the
resource dependence. The latter thus creates potentially greater or at least very different
strategic threats to the seller. To be effective, optimal tariffs have to be successful in
changing the dynamic demand perceived by the seller. The degree of success obviously
depends on the precise formulation of the game, but generally the seller’s sales path still
follows a Hotelling rule modified to take into account the buyers’ tariff policy. This leads
to supplies declining over time. We believe that the technology threat potentially is a
more important determinant of how sellers perceive their future demand.
Second, there is a large but somewhat dated literature on the same bilateral monopoly
situation where the buyers’ strategic variable is to develop or adopt a substitute technol-
ogy. Early papers such as Dasgupta et al. (1983), Gallini et al. (1983), and Hoel (1983)
assume the buyer exploits a Stackelberg leadership and can commit to a deterministic
R&D program for the development of the substitute. The results provide interesting
insights into how the buyer side can extract the seller’s rent by altering the timing of
sales. Later developments analyzed the role of leadership and commitment (Lewis et al.,
1986) and, finally, probabilistic success in R&D and Markov-perfect strategies (Harris
and Vickers, 1995). None of the above papers predict that the basic Hotelling implica-
tions are reversed, although Harris and Vickers (1995) obtain a result that sales path
may be non-monotonic (but not generically increasing).3
The market structure we describe is such that not only sellers have market power but
also buyers enjoy some power so that no party is in explicit leadership. The nature of the
strategic interaction between buyers and sellers is preserved in the limiting case without
discounting, which allows an essentially static analysis and it shows the way to analyze
3It should be clear that we are focusing on how strategic relationships in the resource market shape
the supplies. There are also other ways to explain the failure of the standard Hotelling model (see
Dasgupta and Heal (1974) for the standard model), or its extensions, to match reality (see Krautkramer
(1999) for a review of the literature). And there are other ways to extend the traditional economic
growth-resource depletion model such that supplies increase over time (cf. Tahvonen and Salo 2001).
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the discounted case. Moreover, in addition to market structure assumptions, we depart
from previous literature in that we abstract from the precise instrument implementing the
structural change in demand: when action is taken, it changes the demand irreversibly
after a time lag. This abstraction simplifies the strategic variable on the buyer side while
keeping what seems essential in the relationship.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we discuss some developments
in the oil market that motivate our study. In Section 3, we introduce the basic resource
allocation problem by considering the social optimum, consumers’ optimum, and also
by having a first look at the equilibrium. In Section 4, we introduce and analyze the
game without discounting. In Section 5, we investigate the changes to equilibrium and
robustness of overall findings under discounting. In Section 6, we conclude by discussing
alternative approaches to the problem and potential implications for the oil market.
2 Motivating example: the market for cheap oil
Our contribution is to the basic exhaustible-resource theory but we are motivated by
some recent developments affecting the oil market. First, while there is no single buyer
in the oil market, policies aiming to reduce dependence on imported oil imply a collective
action on the consumer side. Whatever the reason for policies – need to safeguard the
economy against macroeconomic risks or perhaps global warming – they are likely to
affect how oil producers perceive their future demand, influencing supplies today.4 The
results suggest that, under such a threat of structural change in oil demand, the true
resource scarcity cannot be read from the current supply.
Second, while it is clear that the world will never run out of all fossil fuel sources,
it is equally clear that we may run out of conventional, cheap oil. The ownership of
the cheapest oil reserve is extremely concentrated by any measure and concentration
is expected to increase in the near future.5 The concentration of ownership implies
that strategic management of the cheap oil stocks is likely even without a formal cartel
among producers. Cheap oil producers understand their influence on market development
and take an active role in ”demand management”; they often communicate like central
4The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (2006), while being a very comprehensive
cost-benefit analysis, is also a political document illustrating the willingness to take actions changing
the demand for fossil-fuels.
5See the ”2007 Medium-Term Oil Market Report” published by the International Energy Agency for
estimates of the Core OPEC reserves. The Saudi share of the Core OPEC stocks is expected to increase
over time.
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bankers with the market, emphasizing credibility and security of supply.6 The resource
that, for example, Saudi Arabia is controlling is unique in that it allows extraction of high
quality output with relatively little capital investment. It also allows for rapid and large
production rate changes. Reserves with such properties are at the heart of the economics
of the oil dependence because, roughly put, the remainder of the fossil fuel supply is
capital intensive and costly when used for the production of liquid fuels. In fact, what
is essential for the strategic interaction that we consider is the existence of a low-cost
but finite reserve with concentrated ownership and inelastic short-run demand; the rest
of ‘oil’ production can be seen as part of substitute fuel production, including costly
conventional oil sources, nonconventional oils, biofuels, and alternative energy sources.7
While the relationship between major oil importers and exporters is clearly not an
open bargaining situation, as explicit contracts are not conceivable in the context, it
has a flavor of bargaining taking place through markets where offers and responses are
implicit. Sellers’ focus on secure supply suggests a compensation to the importing party
for continuing potentially costly dependence. On the buyer side, trust in the relationship
is expressed by voluntary inaction, that is, postponement of actions changing the demand
structure. Our timing assumptions for strategies are perhaps better suited for capturing
what is material in this kind of relationship than those used in earlier literature.
3 The resource allocation problem
3.1 Socially optimal resource dependence
Before going to strategic interactions, we start the analysis by looking at socially optimal
resource use. This way we will introduce the basic elements of the model and pro-
vide a benchmark so that distortions introduced by strategic interactions become clear.
Throughout we assume that time is continuous.
Consider an economy starting at time t = 0 with a finite resource endowment s0
6The following citation describes this: “We’ve got almost 30 percent of the world’s oil. For us, the
objective is to assure that oil remains an economically competitive source of energy. Oil prices that are
too high reduce demand growth for oil and encourage the development of alternative energy sources”
(Adel al-Jubeir, foreign policy adviser of crown prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, Herald Tribune, Jan
24, 2007).
7There are different definitions of conventional and nonconventional oils, and these also change over
time; see the Hirsch Report (prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, 2005). The report makes clear
that the important scarcity is in the reserves of high-quality conventional oil.
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that can be consumed at rate qt yielding a strictly concave utility u˜(qt). We assume no
extraction costs. The resource has a substitute that provides the same service and ends
the need to use the resource. The economy can choose to adopt the substitute by paying
one-time cost I > 0 at any t, and then wait for interval of time k, so that the alternative
supply infrastructure arrives at time t + k and provides a surplus flow u¯ to consumers
thereafter. Thus, after the time-to-build delay, the substitute fully replaces the resource:
by assumption, the resource is not needed after the change. We can relax this assumption,
without changing the main result, by letting the resource compete with the substitute,
or by making the change gradual and uncertain. We discuss these extensions after the
main model, and ask now the following simple question: how much of the resource should
be used before actions are taken, and how much should be left for the transition time
interval towards the substitute?
To describe the social optimum, it is useful to treat the interval of time over which
there is some resource consumption as an excursion from the long-run situation where the
substitute is present and consumers enjoy surplus u¯ per time unit. The consumer price
is pt = ψ(qt) = u˜
′(qt), and demand is subsequently defined by qt = D(pt) = ψ
−1(pt).
For interpretation, we can assume cost flow c for maintaining the alternative supply
infrastructure and define the long-run surplus flow as
u¯ = u˜(D(0))− c,
but this interpretation is not necessary for the model, i.e., u¯ need not be linked to the orig-
inal utility formulation and then we can abstract from cost flow c. For future reference,
we separate the consumers and producers overall surplus from resource consumption.
Sellers’ profit flow is pi(qt) = ψ(qt)qt and assumed to be strictly concave. Consumers’
surplus is u(qt) = u˜(qt) − pi(qt), and need not be concave.
8 We assume that surplus
u(qt) is everywhere nonlinear,
9 differentiable, and bounded at some level above u¯. The
resource can thus provide surplus above long-run level u¯. Throughout the paper we as-
sume that stock s0 is large enough, so that actions to end resource consumption are not
taken immediately but at some T > 0.
We assume no discounting for now.10 We denote the seller’s stock-dependent payoff
8Consumer surplus will be a central determinant of the buyer’s investment decision, but our results
do not require a particular form for u(q). For example, under linear demand, u(q) is convex on [0, D(0)]
and constant thereafter. For constant elasticity of demand, u(q) is concave for all values of the demand
elasticity.
9That is, there is no non-empty interval (a, b), with a < b, such that u(q) is linear over (a, b).
10In Section 5, we extend the model to positive discounting. It is not obvious that the undiscounted
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by V (st) and consumers’ payoff by W (st) if there has been no investment before t. Ex-
pression V (st) measures cumulative (undiscounted) future profits while W (st) measures
cumulative surplus from the excursion above the long-run surplus from time t onwards:
V (st) =
∫ T+k
t
pi(qτ )dτ (1)
W (st) =
∫ T+k
t
[u(qτ )− u]dτ (2)
The social optimum depends on the time interval of resource use, T + k, and the
supply path qt, that maximizes total resource surplus
W(st) = V (st) +W (st) =
∫ T+k
t
[u˜(qτ )− u]dτ (3)
Notice that we leave the investment costs out of the welfare function since, without
discounting, the timing of investment has no bearing on the net present value of its costs.11
The socially optimal supply solves a simple problem: Maximize (3) with respect to qτ and
T and subject to s˙τ = −qτ . Let variable λτ measure the marginal value of the resource.
The optimality conditions are: (i) marginal utility should equal the marginal value of the
resource; u˜′(qτ ) = λτ ; (ii) marginal value of the resource at the end point T is equal to
the extra utility it provides per extra unit of the resource, λT+k = (u˜(qT+k) − u)/qT+k,
and (iii) without discounting, the marginal value of the resource should be constant,
λτ = λ. From these three conditions, we can see that the resource surplus is linear,
W(st) = λst, and the maximization is equivalent to maximizing the average excursion
above the long-run payoff u:
λ = max
q
[u˜(q)− u]/q.
It is instructive to see Figure 1, where we can find the social optimal supply level q = q∗∗
on the curve of utility u˜(q) such that the line through (0, u) and (q, u˜(q)) has the steepest
slope.12 Recall that utility u˜(q) is concave, and thus q∗∗ must also satisfy
u˜(q∗∗) = u+ q∗∗u˜′(q∗∗).
case is the true discounted equilibrium limit (see Dutta 1991), but in our case it is, as we will verify.
11As we will see, in the case without discounting, the level of investment required does not affect
supply levels in the equilibrium. In the discounting case, it does, see (22), as costs of investments enter
negatively in the costs of waiting e−rku¯−rI . For investments costs too large, I > e−rku¯/r, no investment
takes place.
12We use one asterisk for equilibrium constants, and two asterisks for social optimum constants.
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qu˜(q)
u¯
u¯+ qu˜′(q∗∗)
q∗∗
Figure 1: Determination of socially optimal supply
Since consumer surplus is u(q) = u˜(q)− qu˜′(q), we must have
u(q∗∗) = u. (4)
Proposition 1 In the social optimum, consumers receive reservation utility level u in all
stages, while producers receive all the resource surplus. Consumers do not benefit from
an increase in the resource stock, W ′(s0) = 0.
Proof. The first part of the proposition states that along the social optimal path,
the buyer side is indifferent between resource dependence and the substitute technology.
This part follows immediately from (4). The last part of the proposition then follows
from the definition of the buyer’s payoff (2).
3.2 Buyers’ first-best
Consider then what would be the first-best for the buyer side. This corresponds to a
situation where producers are perfectly competitive and the time of investment is chosen
to maximize W (st) only. Competitive sellers rationally foresee when the buyer side is
going to invest and based on this, they choose a constant supply path to equalize prices
across times before and after the investment. We can copy the template from the social
optimum to show that along consumers’ first-best path, welfare W (.) is linear, that is,
W (s) = λs for some constant λ. In figure 1, we can maximize the buyer’s value of the
resource if we find the supply level q∗ on the curve of utility surplus u(q) where the
line through (0, u) and (q, u(q)) has the steepest slope. The solution either takes the
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maximum demand level, with optimal supply q∗ = D(0),13 or otherwise, optimal supply
q∗ must satisfy
u(q∗) = u+ q∗u′(q∗). (5)
We have a simple graphical determination of the consumers’ optimum,14 which is unique
as u(.) is nonlinear everywhere. In turn q∗ determines the date of investment, by T +k =
s0/q
∗. Relative to the social optimum, consumers can increase their payoff by forcing
sellers to sell the resource faster:
Proposition 2 The resource supply in the buyers’ optimum exceeds resource supply in
social optimum: q∗ > q∗∗. The time interval of resource dependence is shortened.
Proof. From (5) and u′ > 0, it follows that u(q∗) > u, and thus q∗ > q∗∗.
The opposing interests are now clear: the seller side would like to delay investment as
much as possible (to spread supplies thinly over time as profits are concave), the social
optimum requires that consumers at least receive reservation utility, and the buyer side
prefers even faster depletion.15 It is obvious that in the equilibrium of the game supplies
and investment time must lie between the extremes identified here.
For the equilibrium, an important feature is whether q∗ is smaller than the maximal
supply that the seller is willing to provide, qm = arg max{pi(q)}. Recall that a larger q∗
follows from a greater long-run surplus u¯: the buyer wants to consume the resource faster
the better is the outside option. If q∗ is larger than qm, we call the substitute strong.
Definition 1 The buyer has a weak substitute if q∗ < qm. Otherwise, the substitute is
strong.
Throughout this paper, we assume that the substitute is weak, unless explicitly oth-
erwise stated.16 Thus, we assume that the cost of the substitute is high enough such that
13This is, for example, the case with a convex surplus function u(.).
14The graphical presentation of q∗ is very similar to the presentation of q∗∗ in Figure 1. The only
difference is that u(.) should substitute for u˜(.), and that u(.) need not be concave.
15These results are consistent with the common view that the seller’s market power makes the resource-
depletion path more conservative (see Hotelling 1931). Buyers’ market power speeds up consumption
both in the optimal tariff literature (see Karp-Newbery 1993) and strategic R&D and technology liter-
ature (see the papers cited in the introduction).
16For the analysis of the strong substitute cases that we do not consider in this paper, we refer to
Gerlagh and Liski (2007).
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q∗ < qm. The assumption ensures that the buyer’s first-best is given by (5).17 For future
reference, we define the buyer’s first-best marginal value of the resource as
λ∗ = [u(q∗)− u]/q∗.
In the buyers’ optimum, the consumer share of total resource surplus V (s) + W (s0) is
λ∗s; the seller receives the remainder.
3.3 First look at equilibrium: investment indifference
As we will show formally in Section 4, the key to the equilibrium is the seller’s strategy
to keep the buyer side indifferent between the following two actions: (i) invest today and
consume the remaining stock during the transition time interval k, and (ii) postpone the
decision by one marginal unit of time, maintaining the possibility for investing tomor-
row. The seller side postpones investment as long as possible by sustaining the buyer’s
indifference. When the time interval is continuous, the indifference can be characterized,
at each time t, by
u(qt) = u¯+ qtu
′(st/k). (6)
Under the postulated indifference, surplus u(qt) should cover the cost from postponing
the long-run surplus flow u¯ by marginal unit of time, and the cost from depleting the
stock at rate qt.
18 In view of Fig. 2, which depicts a concave surplus frontier and a
line summing up the two cost terms for a given st, we see that the supply making the
indifference to hold is uniquely defined by the intersection of the surplus curve (left-hand
side of (6) as a function of qt) and the cost curve (right-hand side for given st). As the
resource is depleted, st/k declines, which for concave u(.) causes the depletion cost to
increase. That is, the slope of the cost curve (RHS) increases and, therefore, quantity qt
needed for the indifference must increase as well:19
dqt
dst
=
qtu
′′(st/k)
k(u′(qt)− u′(st/k))
< 0 for qt < st/k,
17Since D(0) > qm, the assumption qm > q∗ implies that q∗ must be given by (5) and not by the
corner D(0).
18We immediately see that this condition closely resembles the buyer’s optimum (5). There is one
important distinction. Whereas the right-hand-side of the buyer’s optimum indifference condition (5)
takes the constant marginal value of the resource at the buyer’s optimal path and so defines a constant
q∗, the strategic buyer’s indifference condition (10) is based on the marginal value of the current resource
and so it defines a supply scheme qt that is dependent on the current resource level st.
19The main model section will describe the general case of a not necessarily concave surplus.
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qu(q)
u¯
u¯+ qu′(st/k)
qt st/k
Figure 2: Determination of equilibrium qt
as the numerator is negative while the denominator is positive. Thus, to postpone the
investment, supplies must increase when the remaining resource stock declines, until the
point where the buyers’ optimum given by (5) and the indifference (6) coincide. That
is, buyers will always invest when by doing so they can implement their first best. The
resource level at which investment must take place s∗, is thus defined by buyers’ first-best
supply q∗,
s∗ = kq∗.
It follows that at the time of investment, supplies under continuation and after investment
coincide, at level q∗. The overall path of supplies is thus increasing up to the point of
investment, after which it is constant. Later on, we will be more precise about the supply
path.
4 Strategic resource dependence
There are three types of agents in the model. First, producers of the resource form a
coherent cartel (from now on, the seller). Second, large number of competitive consumers
derive utility from resource consumption or, if present, from consuming the substitute
service provided by the substitute. Third, there is the consumers’ agent who cares only
about the consumer surplus. The buyers’ agent can affect the surplus only by making
the decision to end the relationship with the seller. The decision is about changing the
demand infrastructure; we abstract from the precise policy instrument implementing the
change. Since the only strategic actions are taken by the seller and the buyer’s agent,
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from now on we use the words ‘buyers’ agent’ and ‘buyer’ interchangeably. There is one
single market: the spot market for the resource flow.
4.1 Timing and strategies
The economy has three stages, starting in initial stage before investment, t < T , labeled
with superscript ‘0’. The next stage follows investment, T ≤ t < T + k, also called the
post-investment stage, and labeled with superscript ‘1’. The final stage starts at the
arrival of the new substitute technology, t ≥ T + k. During the pre-investment stage,
buyer and seller interact strategically such that the seller chooses a supply level q0t , and
the buyer decides whether or not to invest, dt ∈ {0, 1}. Since the investment decision is
irreversible, the game moves to the investment stage permanently once the buyer invests.
During the post-investment stage, there are no strategic interactions. The seller can only
sell the remaining stock in interval of time k (or the monopoly quantity qm if the stock
is too large to be sold in this time span), and the buyer side can only accept what is
offered to the market. We denote the quantity sold at time t in the second stage by q1t .
In the final stage, all resources remaining at time T + k are left unused.
Time is continuous but it proves useful to define strategies over discrete time periods,
and then let the time period converge to zero.20 All strategic interaction thus takes place
before investment; technically, we solve a stopping game. At any time t where decisions
are taken, if the game is in the pre-investment stage, we denote the seller’s supply by q0t
and assume that there are three sub-stages with the following timing:
1. Seller chooses a supply q0t ;
2. Buyer chooses dt ∈ {0, 1};
3. If dt = 0, market clears at q
0
t . If dt = 1, the economy moves to post-investment
stage.
The seller’s initial resource stock s0 is known by the buyer side with certainty, and
we can condition strategies on the remaining stock st. We thus look for Markov-perfect
strategies of the form q0t = η(st), and dt = µ(st, q
0
t ) ∈ {0, 1}. Note that because of the
timing assumption (the three substages above), the buyer’s Markov strategy depends not
only on the state but also on the seller’s offer.21
20We follow this approach to make the extensive form of the game clear, and to be able to use
differential methods to characterize the equilibrium.
21In this respect, a similar formulation is used in Felli and Harri (1996) and Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki
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4.2 The buyer’s problem
When buyers have taken the action to move to the substitute, the game is over: buyers
have no more decisions to make and the seller can only sell the remaining stock during
the transition time. When not yet used, the buyer’s strategic investment option will
affect the supply levels. To describe the buyer’s payoff, we need to make it contingent
on whether the strategic variable has been used or not. We define W I(st) as the value
of the excursion above the long-run payoff, measured from current from time t onwards,
immediately after investment when resource dependence still continues for k units of
time. W I(st) is unambiguously determined by the seller’s post-investment supply policy
which is just q1t = min{q
m, st/k} for the remaining sales window.
22 If the buyer’s decision
is made at some time T with sT > 0, then
W I(sT ) =
{
k(u(sT/k)− u¯) if sT < kq
m
k(u(qm)− u¯) otherwise,
(7)
It follows that for sT < kq
m we have W I′(sT ) = u
′(sT/k), which measures the scarcity
cost to the buyer from continued resource dependence.
The seller has a strategy q0t = η(st), and based on the seller’s strategy we find the
strategy for the buyer to invest. The buyer’s best response to η(st) is best understood
when we consider supply constant over a small interval [t, t + ε], and let ε converge to
zero. Using the above expression for W I(st) and assuming the seller’s strategy q
0
t = η(st),
we can write the expression for the payoff before the investment, W (st), when the buyer
optimizes over a short interval with length ε:
W (st) = max
dt∈{0,1}
{[εu(η(st))− εu¯+W (st − εη(st))](1− dt) +W
I(st)dt}. (8)
Term εu¯ is the direct cost from postponing the investment since the buyer side loses
long-run surplus u¯ for ε units of time by not investing today. As ε approaches zero, (8)
can be approximated as follows:
W (st) = max
dt∈{0,1}
{[εu0t − εu¯− εq
0
tW
′(st) +W (st)](1− d) +W
I(st)d}, (9)
where we use shorthands u0t = u(η(st)) and q
0
t = η(st). Thus, if choosing d = 0 is optimal,
(1996).
22Recall that profit pi(q) is concave so it is optimal to allocate the remaining stock evenly, or leave
some stock left if this would imply exceeding the monopoly quantity qm. In the presence of discounting,
the sales path is not flat, but declining as in Hotelling (1931). However, it still holds that all strategic
interactions end at the investment date. See the section on discounting.
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then W (st) ≥ W
I(st) and
u0t = u¯+ q
0
tW
′(st). (10)
This is the key indifference throughout this paper. It says that the consumer surplus un-
der continuation of the resource dependence, u0t , covers the direct cost from continuing,
u¯, and the marginal reduction in payoff from the fact that the stock available for con-
sumption during the remaining overall time interval of resource dependence is depleted,
q0tW
′(st).
4.3 The seller’s problem
Let V I(sT ) denote the seller’s payoff if the buyer makes the decision to end the relation-
ship at stock level sT . This value is simply given by
V I(sT ) =
{
kpi(st/k) if sT < kq
m
kpi(qm) otherwise.
(11)
To consider the seller’s problem before the decision is made, let V (st) denote the value
of the remaining stock to the seller conditional on no investment before t. For short time
interval ε, and given the buyer’s strategy dt = µ(st, q
0
t ), supply in the next ε units of
time is q0t if µ(st, q
0
t ) = 0. The economy immediately moves to the investment stage if
µ(st, q
0
t ) = 1. The seller’s best response satisfies
V (st) = max
{q0
t
}
{[εpi(q0t ) + V (st − εq
0
t )](1− µ(st, q
0
t )) + V
I(st)µ(st, q
0
t )}. (12)
When ε approaches zero, this value can be approximated by (letting µ(·) = µ(st, q
0
t )):
V (st) = max
{q0
t
}
{[εpi(q0t )− εq
0
t V
′(st) + V (st)](1− µ(·)) + V
I(st)µ(·)} (13)
Given µ(st, q
0
t ), the seller can choose if there will be investment or not. If choice µ = 0
is implemented, then by (13), we must have
−q0t V
′(st) + pi(q
0
t ) = 0. (14)
If choice µ = 1 is implemented, then
V (st) = V
I(st). (15)
From these conditions we can immediately see that the seller always prefers to continue
the relationship irrespective of the stock level. Recall that s∗ denotes the stock level at
which the buyer’s first-best is to invest.
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Lemma 1 If q0t ≤ st/k for all st > s
∗, then the seller prefers continuation to stopping.
In particular, V (s∗) = V I(s∗), V ′(st) > V
I′(st) for all st > s
∗, and thus V (st) > V
I(st).
Proof. Equality at s∗ follows from the buyer’s choice to invest at s∗: V (s∗) = V I(s∗).
Assuming q0t ≤ st/k, we have
V ′(st) = ψ(q
0
t ) ≥ ψ(
st
k
) > ψ(
st
k
) +
st
k
ψ′(
st
k
) ≥ V I′(st).
The first equality follows from (14), the second (weak) inequality is by assumption (q0t ≤
st/k), the third (strict) inequality follows from a negative price slope, and the last (weak)
inequality follows from (11). By integration, V (st) > V
I(st) follows.
Thus, the ‘smooth pasting’ condition does not hold for the seller for an intuitively
obvious reason: the buyer’s decision to invest implies a binding time-to-sell constraint for
the seller.23 The seller will never end the dependence before the buyer wants to end it,
as it is always profitable to extend the sales time interval beyond T +k when discounting
is absent.24 For this reason, when the stock level is public knowledge and q0t ≤ st/k , it
will be the buyer’s indifference that determines the time to end the resource dependency.
4.4 Equilibrium
Establishing and characterizing equilibrium supply is a simple undertaking based on the
analysis of buyer’s indifference between continuation and stopping, given that the seller
side never prefers stopping. We first prove that (7) defines the buyer’s welfare any time
before investment:
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, the buyer is indifferent between continuing the resource de-
pendence and investing at any given t prior to the investment date:
W (st) = W
I(st) for all st ≥ s
∗ (16)
23The lemma shows that the model can easily be extended to cover the case when the seller has
the opportunity to sell its stock after the arrival of the substitute. The important feature is that the
marginal value of the resource after the arrival of the substitute must be less than ψ(q∗). Assume that
the substitute has marginal production costs mc. The marginal value of the resource after the arrival of
the substitute is thus mc. As long as marginal substitute costs are sufficiently small, mc < ψ(q∗), the
lemma will hold. Constant extraction costs do not change the trade-off between supply before and after
the arrival of the substitute.
24We will derive this same condition also with discounting but there we need restrictions on the utility
formulation.
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Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume W (st) > W
I(st) at some st > s
∗.
The inequality implies that the buyer will always choose dt = 0 in (8), irrespective of the
seller’s supply. In turn, the seller is not constrained to reduce supplies and he can extend
the time interval of resource dependence to obtain higher prices from all dates. Supply
will fall arbitrarily close to zero, the utility excursion compared to u¯ becomes negative for
a time interval of unbounded length, and W (st) becomes negative (2), which contradicts
W (st) > W
I(st).
It is thus the buyer’s indifference that determines equilibrium supply policy, q0t =
η(st). The buyer’s indifference condition (16) together with (10) requires
u(q0t ) = u¯+ q
0
t u
′(st/k) if st < kq
m (17)
u(q0t ) = u¯ otherwise. (18)
This is a slightly adjusted version of (6) because W ′t (st) = u
′(st/k) when st < kq
m,
but W ′t (st) = 0 otherwise as the stock level does not affect supply if st > kq
m. We
have already illustrated this indifference for a concave surplus u in Fig. 2. Recall that
the investment point satisfies q0t = s
∗/k = q∗, which is the buyer’s first-best supply as it
maximizes the buyer’s payoff from this stock level onwards. The seller cannot compensate
the buyer for continuation after the stock has fallen just below s∗ because the buyer can
implement his first-best by ending the relationship there. Alternatively put, the scarcity
cost exceeds the maximal marginal value of the resource,
W ′(st) > λ
∗ = [u(q∗)− u]/q∗,
when st < s
∗ and u is (locally) concave.
We describe now the general case with u not necessarily concave. Recall that the
buyer’s first-best supply q∗ satisfies
u(q∗) = u¯+ q∗u′(q∗)
and that the buyer never accepts stock levels below kq∗, as buyers can always implement
their first-best from time t onwards if they end the relationship at st = kq
∗. In the
following it is convenient to redefine s∗ not to be the investment point in the buyer’s first
best, but to be the equilibrium investment point. It is clear that we must have s∗ ≥ kq∗.
However, since the consumer surplus is not generally concave, the buyer may also end
the relationship at some higher stock level st > kq
∗, because the scarcity cost u′(s/k)
may locally increase above λ∗ = u′(q∗) as st/k declines from s0/k towards q
∗. To deal
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with this, we define s∗ to be the first stock level below s0 such that u
′(s∗/k) = λ∗. Stock
s∗ is unique for given s0, and we have by construction
u′(st/k) < u
′(q∗)
for all s∗ < st ≤ kq
m. By continuity of u(.), q0t = η(st) satisfying (17) to keep the buyer
indifferent between stopping and continuing exists and varies with the remaining stock
for s∗ < st < kq
m.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium with s∗ as defined above,
q0t defined by (17)-(18), and q
1
t = s
∗/k.
Proof. It suffices to prove that s∗ is determined properly. Clearly, we cannot take
s∗ to be smaller as such would imply an infeasible resource supply from (17). We will
now prove that s∗ cannot be larger either. For this, it is sufficient to prove that s∗
maximizes the value of the resource to the seller. But this follows from Lemma 1: the
seller maximizes profits by continuing as long as possible.
Under nonconcave surplus, the increase in supply over time may not be monotonic as
the buyer’s scarcity cost u′(st/k) may not be monotonic (u
′′ may change sign). However,
when the equilibrium path approaches the investment point, supplies must increase, so
that our main conclusion holds irrespective of the utility functional form.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium supply path q0t is
1. constant at level u−1(u¯) when st > kq
m;
2. varying over time in u−1(u¯) ≤ q0t ≤ q
∗ when s∗ < st < kq
m, but ultimately increas-
ing to q∗ as st approaches s
∗;
3. strictly increasing for all s∗ < st < kq
m if consumer surplus u(.) is concave
4.5 Discussion
The assumption that it takes time to change the demand is necessary for our result
that supplies increase over time. When the time-to-build delay k is extremely short,
the buyer knows that the alternative surplus flow u¯ will arrive almost immediately after
investment. Then, the buyer’s outside option is just the long-run surplus, and the seller
needs to supply only u−1(u¯) to keep him indifferent. The seller will receive the whole
surplus and, therefore, he will implement the first best.
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A larger k captures the idea of having capacity constraints in making a fast transition
to the substitute. The buyer will feel the scarcity cost from a decreasing stock for a longer
period and, therefore, will require a larger compensation to continue without investment.
A larger k thus means that the buyer will realize earlier that there is scarcity during the
transition period, and the upward pressure on supplies will start ealier, i.e., at higher
current stock levels. In this sense, the buyer’s outside option is more sensitive to the
stock level st, and he will be able capture larger part of the overall surplus.
The above simple formalization of the time-to-build delay captures quite well a gen-
eral idea. Let us now briefly discuss alternative but qualitatively equivalent ways of
formalizing the transition to the substitute. First, the buyer’s decision could trigger a
gradual adjustment of the demand rather than the above one-time event taking place af-
ter the time-to-build period. One way to formalize a gradual adjustment is to assume an
exogenous rate of decline for the fraction of the demand still depending on the resource.
This would change essentially nothing in our main model. Another way to proceed is
to assume that at each period after making the decision d = 1, the buyer chooses an
investment rate, i.e., how many units of demand to switch. If investment cost is linear,
the buyer can switch all units at once, which would lead an equilibrium equivalent to the
one obtained when k is almost zero in our main model. When adjustment (investment)
costs are strictly convex, possibly with a per period capacity constraint on the rate of
change, then the buyer cannot change his dependence on the resource quickly, and the
equilibrium dynamics come close to those achieved under k > 0 in our model. In this
sense, k captures adjustment costs in the demand change.
Second, uncertainty regarding the transition to the substitute can be captured in
many ways. A simple extension is to treat k as a random variable, which would not
affect the nature of our results in any material way. Alternatively, the buyer’s decision
d = 1 could trigger a random process with a downward trend for the fraction of demand
still depending on the resource. The seller would face stochastic demand over stochastic
time horizon but the ex ante values from entering this phase could still be evaluated in
a straightforward way for both players, and the strategic interaction before investment
would not essentially differ from our what we have described.
Let us then finally discuss our assumption that the resource cannot compete with
the substitute, once in place. Recall that we abstract from the substitute’s marginal
production costs and resource extraction costs. We could as well have assumed that
marginal production costs for the substitute fall short of resource extraction costs so
that the resource has no use when the substitute is in place. Even if the resource can
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compete with the substitute, the three main features that support our analysis can be
maintained.25 First, if supplied in large quantities, the buyer prefers the resource to
the substitute. This feature gives the seller some bargaining power as it ensures that
the buyer has an interest in exhausting the resource. Second, profits for the resource
owner decrease when the substitute is available compared to the situation without the
substitute. This feature ensures that the seller will try to delay the investment in the
substitute and it transfers some bargaining power to the buyer. Third, early investment
in the substitute is costly. This feature ensures that the substitute does not become
available before it is used capping the buyer’s strategic power.
5 Discounting
Discounting is an important element in resource use when the relevant time horizon is
decades at least. In the traditional Hotelling model, discounting is what distinguishes
markets at different dates, which, in the presence of market power, leads to intertemporal
price discrimination. Discounting is thus one reason to discriminate buyers at different
dates. Another reason is the buyer’s changing opportunity cost of continuing the re-
source dependence due to stock depletion, which we have identified in the undiscounted
analysis. The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, we show that the discounted
equilibrium converges to the undiscounted limit we have described. Second, we explain
how the above two distinct reasons for price discrimination evolve as the stock deple-
tion progresses. We present a situation where supplies initially decline, when the stock
is large, as in a traditional Hotelling exhaustible resource market. However, ultimately
supplies must increase, when stock declines and the buyer’s outside option starts to drive
the equilibrium dynamics as in the undiscounted case.
Let now the continuous-time discount rate be positive, r > 0. Apart from discounting,
the model is the same as before. In the post-investment phase, discounting does not
change much: for the seller, there is a unique profit-maximizing supply path, equalizing
present-value marginal revenues over the remaining sales time interval, and resulting
in an associated value function V I(sT ) at the time of investment when the remaining
resource stock is sT .
In the pre-investment time interval, at each stock level, the seller’s optimal sale q0t is
25In the footnote after Lemma 1, we show that the equilibrium does not change qualitatively if the
substitute and the resource can compete.
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a best-response to the buyer’s stopping rule µ(st, q
0
t ) satisfying
V (st) = max
{q0
t
}
{[εpi(q0t ) + e
−rV (st − εq
0
t )](1− µ(st, q
0
t )) + V
I(st)µ(st, q
0
t )}, (19)
where, as in the undiscounted equation (12), the strategies are defined over some discrete
period of time ε. In the limit of short time period ε, the value function V (st) satisfies
−q0t V
′(st) + pi(q
0
t )− rV (st) = 0. (20)
The unique seller’s supply path after investment also defines the buyer’s welfare
W I(sT ), where we note that since W
I(sT ) measures only value of the excursion above the
long-run situation where flow payoff u¯ is achieved, the overall welfare at the investment
time is equal to W I(sT ) + u¯/r −I. The buyer’s payoff before investment is now given by
W (st) + u¯/r − I = max
dt∈{0,1}
{[εu(η(st)) + e
−rW (st − εη(st)) + e
−ru¯/r − e−rI](1− dt)
+W I(st)dt}. (21)
Letting ε converge to zero, we find the positive discounting equivalent of (10):
u0t = u¯− rI + rW
I(st) + q
0
tW
I′(st). (22)
When the buyer is indifferent between continuation and stopping, (22) holds as an
equality with obvious interpretation: waiting cost of continuation is now u¯− rI and, in
addition to the depletion effect q0tW
I′(st), buyers must receive return on the asset they are
holding (investment option), rW I(st). Assuming that the buyer’s indifference condition is
uniformly continuous in (st, q
0
t ), it is also continuously differentiable in r, and so it is clear
that for r → 0, the equilibrium uniformly converges to the zero-discounting equilibrium.
Thus, the zero-discounting equilibrium describes well the equilibrium features of a low-
discount rate equilibrium. The investment point sT = s
∗ occurs when the seller cannot
compensate the buyer for any lower stock level, that is, when
u′(qT ) = W
I′(sT ).
For zero discounting, we have seen that this condition is equivalent to u′(q∗) =
u′(s∗/k), q0t = q
∗, which ensures that supply (immediately) after investment s∗/k, which
we labeled as q1T , is equal to supply immediately before investment, q
0
T = q
∗ = q1T . With
positive discounting, there may be a jump up (or down) in supply at the moment of
investment if u′(q1T ) 6= W
I′(s∗). To ensure continuity, we need restrictions on demand.
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We can solve the equilibrium explicitly by assuming constant elasticity of demand
 = − 1
1−σ
, generated by utility function, u˜(q) = qσ, with 0 < σ < 1. Thus, ψ(q) = σqσ−1,
pi(q) = σqσ, and u(q) = (1 − σ)qσ. Under positive discounting, the supply qt after
investment satisfies pi′(qt) = e
r(t−T )λ, for some λ > 0 (marginal revenues are equalized in
present value). Using this condition, some manipulation gives
V I(s) = σAsσ
W I(s) = (1− σ)Asσ −
1− e−rk
r
u¯,
where A =
(
ω
1−e−ωk
)σ (
1−e−ωσk
ωσ
)
and ω = r
1−σ
. For the investment to yield a positive
return, we assume e
−rk
r
u¯− I > 0. The buyer’s indifference condition (22) becomes
qσ =
e−rku¯− rI
1− σ
+ rAsσ + qσAsσ−1. (23)
where, for convenience of notation, we substituted q for q0t .
Notice that when r → 0, A→ k1−σ and we get
W I(s) = k[(1− σ)(s/k)σ − u¯]
V I(s) = kσ(s/k)σ
(1− σ)qσ = u¯+ qσ(1− σ)(s/k)σ−1,
consistent with equations (7), (11), and (17).
In the appendix, we show that supply is continuous at investment point: q1T = q
∗.
This requires u′(q1T ) = W
I′(s). This finding is used to prove that the seller prefers
continuation to stopping at the investment point, which ensures that (23) holds up to
the point where investment takes place. We can then use continuity of supply and (23)
to establish the values for the resource stock and supply level at the investment point.
Given σ, assume k and r satisfy
σ(1− e−ωk)σ > 1− e−ωσk (24)
we then have
s∗ = [
e−rku¯− rI
(1− σ)2A
−σ
1−σ − (1− σ)rA
]−1/σ
q∗ = A
1
σ−1 s∗
These findings lead to the following:
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Figure 3: Equilibrium supply path under discounting
Proposition 5 For constant elasticity of demand and (24) satisfied, pre-investment equi-
librium supplies first decline and then increase over time when s0 is sufficiently large.
Proof. See Appendix.
We depict the equilibrium time path for supply in Fig. 3, as well as the buyer’s
optimal path. The latter involves choosing the highest supply path such that (i) prices
are equal in present value, and (ii) the stock remaining at the investment time, T ∗, is
consumed during the technology transition time interval. The equilibrium s∗ is, like in
the undiscounted case, exactly equal to the buyer’s optimal s∗ because, due to constant
elasticity of demand, in the post-investment phase the seller supplies a competitive path
in both cases as the constant demand elasticity eliminates the possibility of price discrim-
ination at different dates after the investment (see Gilbert 1978). The two paths in Fig. 3
are therefore identical during the technology transition time interval, starting at T ∗ and
T , respectively. However, before investment, the strategic seller can discriminate buyers
at different dates according to (22) (the explicit constant elasticity of demand solution is
given in (23)) and delay the arrival of the substitute as in the undiscounted case. When
the stock is still large, supplies decrease over time as in the standard Hotelling model.
When the stock becomes smaller and approaches s∗, supplies increase over time as in the
undiscounted case because the buyer’s indifference becomes binding.
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we considered strategic interactions between the seller of a depletable
resource and consumers who have interests in ending their dependence on the resource.
We modeled the situation using a framework that departs from explicit bargaining but
allows offers and responses such that neither party is in explicit leadership. The approach
seems relevant since there is significant coordination of actions on both sides of the oil
market, for example, but at the same time explicit cooperation of the two sides is not
feasible by the difficulty of enforcing international agreements. The key question in the
relationship is when to start the process ending the resource dependence, that is, when
to change the demand. The process changing the demand takes time and therefore a
potentially significant fraction of the resource has to be saved for the transition time
interval. Our insights to the problem follow from this simple allocation problem.
The main insight from our analysis is that producers’ market power is reduced over
time as continuing the relationship becomes more costly to consumers when the stock
available for the demand transition is depleted. This means that changing the demand
infrastructure becomes more relevant as a choice, leading to the conclusion that producers
must increase supplies over time to postpone the buyer’s action. In contrast with previous
approaches to such strategic dependence, the basic implications of the Hotelling (1931)
model are reversed.
What are the main lessons from these results for understanding the oil market? We
believe it is the insight that energy technology policies in oil-importing countries can act
as an increasingly effective strategic instrument, in part destroying producers scarcity
rents. While in general this insight is not new, our approach is new as it accounts for the
fact that the transition is not an immediate event, and this insight results in explicitly
increasing supplies in a stationary market environment.
There are several well-established explanations why scarcity rents do not seem to
drive supply behavior in oil or other exhaustible resource markets: declining extraction
costs due to technological progress can lead to U-shaped price paths; durability of the
final good; learning of new reserves; and imperfect competition (see Gaudet 2007) for
a review of the literature). Our explanation is complementary and distinct from any of
explanations presented in this literature.
On a theoretical level, there are some obvious extensions. As we have seen, the size
of the remaining stock is what determines the seller’s ability to entice the buyer side to
postpone actions ending the resource dependence: it is critical for the buyer to observe
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how much resource is left for the transition, otherwise the seller can take advantage of
the buyer’s imperfect information for the right timing of the demand change. Recall that
the larger is the stock, the lower is the equilibrium supply (at earlier points on the sales
path stocks are larger). In this precise sense, a large stock implies more power to reduce
supplies than a small stock. If the stock is not observed by the buyer side, a small seller
can potentially mimic large seller’s policy of reducing supplies and, thereby, extend the
investment date from what would otherwise hold for the small seller.
The above observation suggests an extension to situations where there is asymmet-
ric information about the size of the seller’s resource stock. The study of asymmetric
information in resource extraction can also be motivated by the developments in the oil
market. The core reserves of cheap oil are not managed like most productive assets in
market economies; management of cheap oil is characterized by secrecy. The dynasties of
Middle East do not disclose technical production information and make efforts to prevent
auditing of the reserves. The future availability of conventional oil is a major public
concern in oil importing countries; industry experts’ opinions on the size of economi-
cally viable stocks diverge widely.26 We have presented a preliminary analysis of the
asymmetric information equilibrium in our working paper Gerlagh-Liski (2007).
Other extensions are the following. Adding a fringe of competitive producers would
reduce the seller’s market power in a rather straightforward way; the fringe would free-ride
on the seller’s market power by selling first when the prices are high. Uncertainty about
the technology transition time interval would affect the precise timing of investment
and the level of the supply path, but not the basic insights. A less straightforward
extension is a reversed asymmetric information situation where the buyer side privately
knows whether the adoption decision has been made but the resource stock size is public
information. Alternatively, under the R&D interpretation, the buyer privately knows the
state of the technology. We leave these interesting topics open for future research.
26These concerns are reviewed in the Hirsch report. A book by Matthew R. Simmons (2005) explicates
carefully the industry experts concerns regarding the Saudi stocks. While it is hard to judge the validity
of the arguments in general, one cannot escape the fact that the market cannot evaluate the maturity
of the main Saudi oil fields; Saudi Aramco has not disclosed technical production information since the
early 1980 (Simmons).
24
7 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 5
We prove Proposition 5, through a series of lemmas. The first lemma shows that supply is
continuous at investment point: q1T = q
∗. As noted in the main text, this requires u′(q1T ) =
W I′(s). The second lemma uses this finding to prove that sellers prefer continuation to
stopping at the investment point, which ensures that (23) holds up to the point where
investment takes place. The third lemma then uses continuity of supply and (23) to
establish the values for the resource stock and supply level at the investment point. It
also shows that the slope for (s, q) defined by (23) is downwards for values of s close to
s∗, but upwards for large values of s.
Lemma 3 Under constant elasticity of demand, equilibrium supply is continuous at the
investment point.
Proof. Let q1T refer to optimal monopoly supply immediately after investment. With
zero discounting, we had u′(q1T ) = W
I′(s∗) as q1T equals the consumption level throughout
the post-investment phase until the substitute arrives. With positive discounting, this
equation does not always hold. Let q1T be supply immediately after investment, so that
λ = pi′(qI). Thus, when the resource stock increases by small amount ∆s, then supply
changes ∆qt satisfy pi
′′(qt)∆qt = e
r(t−T )∆λ, for some ∆λ such that
∫ T+k
T
∆qtdt = ∆s,
that is,
∫ T+k
T
er(t−T )
pi′′(qt)
dt = ∆s/∆λ. For notation, let us use µt =
pi′(qt)
u′(qt)
= qu˜
′′(qt)
u˜′(qt)
+ 1. The
value of µ measures one minus the relative risk aversion.
W I′(s∗) =
∆W I′(s)
∆s
=
∫ T+k
T
e−r(t−T )u′(qt)∆qtdt∫ T+k
T
∆qtdt
=
∫ T+k
T
e−r(t−T )µtpi
′(qt)∆qtdt∫ T+k
T
∆qtdt
=
∫ T+k
T
µt∆qtdt∫ T+k
T
∆qtdt
λ =
∫ T+k
T
µt∆qtdt∫ T+k
T
µT ∆qtdt
u′(q1T ). (25)
The difference between W I′(s∗) and u′(q1T ) is caused by the difference between the
average value of µt over the post-investment time interval [T, T + k], and its value at
time T . It is clear that, for utility with constant relative risk aversion, W I′(s∗) = u′(q1T ).
If utility has decreasing relative risk aversion, relative risk aversion will increase with
decreasing qt, and µt will increase, so that W
I′(s∗) > u′(q1T ). Similarly, if utility has
increasing relative risk aversion, W I′(s∗) 6 u′(q1T ).
Lemma 4 Under constant elasticity of demand, the sellers prefer continuation to stop-
ping at the investment point.
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Proof. We will show that the seller’s value function has a kink at the time of
investment, V ′(s∗) > V I′(s∗) when W I′(s∗) = u′(q1T ), so the sellers would always prefer
continuation rather than stopping in such a situation. Changes in k play a role in the
argument, and so we write the seller’s payoff as a function of both the stock level and the
transition time length k. We write V I(st, k) and V
I(st) interchangeably, and similarly
V Is (st, k) and V
I′(st). Flow profits are concave by assumption, and supplies strictly
positive at the end of the overall sales time interval, qT+k > 0, so it is clear that the
seller’s value of the resource increases with the transition time length k, V Ik (st, k) > 0.
After investment, the value function satisfies the following Bellman equation
V I(s∗, k) = εpi(q1T ) + e
−rV (s∗ − εqI , k − ε). (26)
Taking the limit for ε→ 0 (leaving k out of notation), we get
pi(q1T )− rV
I(s∗)− q1TV
I
s (s
∗)− V Ik (s
∗) = 0. (27)
Thus, pi(q1T ) > rV
I(s∗) + qIV I′(s∗). This together with continuous supply implied by
Lemma 3 and value matching, V (s∗) = V I(s∗), implies V ′(s∗) > V I′(s∗).
Lemma 5 Given σ, assume k and r satisfy
σ(1− e−ωk)σ > 1− e−ωσk. (28)
Then,
s∗ = [
e−rku¯− rI
(1− σ)2A
−σ
1−σ − (1− σ)rA
]−1/σ (29)
q∗ = A
1
σ−1 s∗
For s ≥ s∗ but sufficiently close to s∗, seller’s supply q0t = η(st) is defined by (23) and
declining in st. For s sufficiently large, q
0
t = η(st) is increasing in st.
Proof. We find the equilibrium s∗ in the lemma by using W I′(s∗) = u′(q), which
defines q∗, in (23) and noting that the buyer’s indifference can hold only if (28) holds;
we can focus on buyer’s indifference based on Lemma 4.
Given (28), we verify that q0t = η(st) defined by (23) is decreasing in s for s > s
∗.
Condition (23) implicitly defines two values of q given s > s∗. The equilibrium strategy
must satisfy dV ′(s)/dq < 0 where V ′(s) is given by (20) and evaluated at (s, q) = (s∗, q∗).
Condition (28) ensures that this holds and implies that the lower trajectory ending at
26
(s∗, q∗) is the equilibrium strategy. Thus, equilibrium supply q0t = η(st) defined by the
buyer’s indifference (23) is decreasing for levels of st close to s
∗. The downward slope
of q0t = η(st) continues until a point is reached where q
0
t = ωst. After this point, q
0
t
defined by (23) becomes increasing in st. Since, at the investment point, (28) ensures
that q∗ > ωs∗, we must have that the point with q0t = ωst is reached for st > s
∗. At
the same time, the seller’s profit maximization also defines a supply level that increases
with the stock level for reasons similar to the Hotelling rule. Thus, for large stock levels,
whether the sellers prefer to sell more than needed to prevent the buyer from investing, or
whether the buyer’s indifference condition determines supplies, for large stocks, supplies
will initially fall when the stock is depleted.
Condition (28) can be seen as a restriction on rk, the cumulative discount rate over the
entire transition time. For rk = 0, LHS=RHS=0 in (28). For rk ↓ 0, the LHS derivative
w.r.t. rk becomes infinite (the LHS is proportional to σ( rk
1−σ
)σ), while the RHS becomes
proportional to rkσ
1−σ
, thus the inequality holds. For rk large, the LHS converges to σ,
while the RHS converges to 1, thus the inequality fails. If either the discount rate r
or transition time k is sufficiently large, investment will take place immediately without
any time interval of strategic interaction. In terms of the equations, this can be seen as
follows. When (28) comes close to an equality, the denominator of s∗ in (29) goes to zero,
and so s∗ goes to infinity.
The proposition in text is now proved by Lemmas 3-5.
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